it and that if he wanted to deceive his brother, he should lead his brother towards the green cupboard.
Thus it seems that representation of other people's mindset comes fairly late in childhood, well after they have learned to deal with notions of belief and belief based action for themselves and for others who share their own view of reality. In [CS] Chris Steinsvold investigates modal logics which are intended to represent the states of mind of young children. See also [SP] .
Older children are not much better. In an experiment in my daughter's 7th grade class, I found that they were unable to deal with the muddy children puzzle beyond the first one or two levels.
In this, by now well known puzzle, a number of children are playing in the mud and some of them get their foreheads dirty. At this the father comes on the scene and announces, "at least one of you has got her forehead dirty".
Scenario 1:
Suppose there is only one child, say Amy, who is dirty. Then she will realize that her own forehead must be dirty since she can see that the others are clean.
Scenario 2: Suppose now that there are two dirty children, Sarah and Amy, who are asked in turn, "Do you know if your forehead is dirty?" Now when Sarah is asked, she can see Amy's dirty forehead and she replies, "I don't know". However, when Amy is asked, she is able to reason, "If my forehead were clean, Sarah would have known that hers must be dirty since all the others are clean. But Sarah did not know. So my forehead must be dirty."
This reasoning on Amy's part requires a representation by Amy of Sarah's state of mind, and clearly Amy must be at least six for this to work. However, Sarah herself must have some reasoning ability and Amy must know that she has such abilities. It is not enough for Amy to know Sarah's view of reality, she must also represent Sarah's logical abilities in her own mind.
As the number of dirty children goes up, there is a need for higher and higher levels of "I know that he knows that she knows that...". Common knowledge is at the end of this road and has been offered as the explanation of co-ordinated behaviour ( [Lew, HM, CM] ). For instance Halpern and Moses in [HM] show that the co-ordinated attack problem requires common knowledge between the two generals, and that given the means of communication they have, such common knowledge is impossible to attain. Clark and Marshall indicate similar difficulties with the referent of "the movie playing at the Roxy today".
While it is true that co-ordinated actions and, supposedly, common knowledge do happen, it may also be relevant to consider other levels of knowledge, short of the infinite, common knowledge, level.
2 Such levels also arise in certainly pragmatic situations, e.g. with email or snailmail or messages left on telephones as voice mail. Thus the purpose of this paper is to study levels other than common knowledge.
In typical co-operative situations even if a certain level of knowledge is needed, a higher level would also do. If Bob wants Jill to pick up the children at 4 PM, it is enough for him to know that she knows. Thus if he sends her email at 2 PM and knows that she always reads hers at 3 PM, he can be satisfied. In such a situation Bob knows that Ann will know about the children in time, or symbolically K b (K a (C)) and he may feel this is enough. However, if he telephones her at 3 PM instead, this will create common knowledge of C, much more than is needed. But no harm done, since in this context, Ann and Bob have the same goals. Halpern and Zuck also state a knowledge level requirement for the sequence transmission problem, which suffices as a minimum, but since the parties are co-ordinating, a higher level does not harm.
But in other contexts one may wish for just a particular level of knowledge, no lower, and no higher. Suppose for instance that Bob wants Ann to know about a seminar talk he is giving, just in case she wants to come, but he does not want her to feel pressured to come -she should come only out of interest and not from politeness. In that case he will want to arrange that K b (K a (S)), (he himself knows that she knows about the seminar) but not
) (Ann knows that Bob knows that Ann knows about the seminar), for in the latter case she would feel pressured. Instead of telling her about his talk, which would create common knowledge, he may arrange for some other method, perhaps for a student to tell her, but without saying that it is a message from Bob.
Suppose a pedestrian is crossing the street and sees a car approaching him. It happens in many cities, Boston, Naples, etc., that the pedestrian will pretend not to notice the car, thereby preventing K d K p (C) with C representing the car, d being the driver and p the pedestrian. If the driver knew that the pedestrian knew, he might drive aggressively and try to bully the pedestrian into running or withdrawing. But if he does not know that the pedestrian knows, he will be more cautious.
While the social questions are fascinating and are addressed elsewhere (Cf. [Pa3] ), in this paper we shall concentrate on the technical aspects of knowledge, where it is assumed that everyone involved is logically perfect. One can still ask, what are the various levels of knowledge which can arise under various circumstances of communication?
moving and in the morning as he was going to work, Mrs. Wiener said to him, "Now don't come home to this address in the evening." And she gave him a piece of paper with the new address. However, in the evening Wiener found himself standing in front of the old address and not knowing what to do -he had in the meanwhile lost the slip of paper with the new address. He went to a little girl standing by and said, "Little girl, do you know where the Wieners have moved to?" The little girl replied, "Daddy, Mom knew what would happen so she sent me to fetch you." The moral of the story, for us, is that common knowledge works only if the memory of all parties involved is reliable.
Model of a distributed system
Note: most of the results which follow are joint with Paul Krasucki, except where indicated, and full proofs are available in [PK] .
We assume that there are a finite number of processes, 1, ..., n, which compute and communicate with each other either by asynchronous messages or by broadcasts. Our network is assumed to be fully connected 3 (there is a channel from every process to every other process).
Asynchronous communication consists of two phases: send and receive. All messages sent are ultimately delivered (and they are delivered in the order in which they were sent) but the delay (transmission time) may be arbitrarily long.
Broadcasts are fully reliable, synchronous communications
4 where all processes involved simulteneously receive the message sent by one of them. Now we formally specify our class of models. Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of all processors. Every processor i has infinitely many possible initial states v. Every initial state is a string of 0's and 1's (v ∈ {0, 1} * ). The set of initial states for i we denote by
From now on we will use lower case letters to denote everything pertaining to a single process. Capitals will be used where all the processes are involved (e.g. v i is an initial state of a processor i, while V is an initial configuration of the whole system: V = (v 1 , ..., v n )).
Events: E i denotes the set of all events in which processor i can participate (events local to i). There are the following types of events (or actions):
2. s(i, j, m): Sending a message m to a processor j, j ∈ N .
3. r(j, i, m): Receiving a message m from a processor j, j ∈ N . 4. bc(i, U, m): Sending a broadcast m to a group of processors U , i ∈ U ⊆ N . The same event is receiving a broadcast m by a group of processes U .
If the network is not fully connected then some levels of knowledge may be impossible to realize due to the lack of communication capabilities, e.g. if a processor is isolated (cannot communicate with anyone)then the other processes cannot learn anything from that process. Interesting questions arise in case of a directed network where every process may communicate with every other process but some communications are necessarily indirect (go through other processes). We will not analyze this case here.
4 The two kinds of communications can be looked at as two kinds of communication media e.g. mailing system (asynchronous) and telephone lines (synchronous). Since we allow for synchronous communication between more than two processes at a time, our telephone system must have "conference call" capability.
We define the set of global events G in our system. G ⊆ n i=1 (E i ∪ {null}) (a cartesian product) s.t. if (e 1 , ..., e i , ..., e n ) ∈ G for some i and e i = bc(j, U, m) then for all i ∈ U , e i = bc(j, U, m). If e i = null for some i, it means that there is no local event at i at this point. Note that null is not local to any process. We use the notation (G) i to denote the ith coordinate of G, so (e 1 , ..., e i , ..., e n ) i = e i .
Histories: A history (a run) is an input value followed by a sequence of events. Let's call the set of all possible histories of the system -a protocol P. So P ⊆ V ; G * . Protocols are always closed under taking an initial segment of a history: H ∈ P implies that every H which is an initial segment of H is in P.
We will require that for every receive in every history in every protocol there is exactly one corresponding send and it occurs before receive (this condition we will call timeconsistency).
We say that two histories H and H are compatible iff they start with the same input values.
We can define the concatenation of compatible histories: If H 1 = V ; G 1 ; . . . ; G k , and H 2 = V ; G 1 ; . . . ; G l , then H is the concatenation of H 1 and
Local histories are the projections of global histories onto the sets of local events of the processors. They are "time-forgetting".
We assume that a global event -the ticking of the clock -takes place even if no local events take place at a particular moment. Given i, and the global history H, the local history h i consisting of the events seen by i, is uniquely defined and we let Φ i be the map which takes us from H to h i .
The local history is everything the processor sees, so all the global histories which correspond to the same local history h i look the same to the processor i. Note that the length of Φ i (H) is less than or equal to the length of H. In fact length(Φ i (H)) = length(H) iff there are no null events on i in H.
For every i we can define an equivalence relation on the set of global histories:
This relation is extended to groups U by letting H ≈ U H iff there exists a chain H = H 1 , H 2 , ..., H m = H and for all i < n, there is a j ∈ U such that H i ≈ j H i+1 .
We use capital letters to denote global histories, events etc, lower case letters do denote local histories, events etc.
Closure Conditions for the Protocol: We impose some additional conditions on the protocol P. We want to ensure that the initial state of i (v i ) cannot be known to any other process j at any run of the system, unless j learns about v i from some communication. We want to exclude the possibility that something is common knowledge "accidentally". To achieve that we will make sure that all the initial states are possible. Moreover, if v i is the initial state of i, all other strings v i will remain possible for j as initial states of i, unless j gets some message from i to the contrary (directly or via some other processors).
1) All vectors of input values are possible: ∀V s.t. V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) where every v i is a sequence of 0's and 1's there is some H ∈ P s.t. for some H , H = V ; H .
2) No sequence of local events on some group of processes can influence possible actions of some other group of processes unless there are some communications (of course assuming that both groups are disjoint).
For that we need some closure conditions on the set of all protocols. The first condition we use is due to [CM] (it is the first of their principles of computation extension ).
We need one definition: Let G = (e 1 , . . . e n ), G is on U if U = {i|(G) i = null} (so U is the set of processes which have some local events in G).
Closure conditions:
(i) Extension Rule: Let ∀i ∈ U, H ≈ i H , G is on U , none of (G) i is receive r(j, i, m) for any j not in U , then ( H ∈ P, H; G ∈ P) ⇒ H ; G ∈ P The extension rule guarantees that if we have a protocol P, some history H in P and some action of a group of processes U is possible in H, then the same action must be possible in every history H which looks the same to all processes in U unless it violates time-consistency. In order to explain why e i cannot be a receive from a processor outside of U let us examine an example: , s(3, 1, m) ), H = (null, null, null). Clearly H ≈ 1 H and H ≈ 2 H . If we take G = (r (3, 1, m) , null, null) s.t. H; G ∈ P then requiring H ; G to be in P would violate time-consistency.
The following conditions ensure that no process can get any additional information about the other processes by observing its own local events (no hidden synchronization). These conditions are necessary because (unlike [CM] ) we allow local events at different sites at the same instant of time. Condition (ii) says that if some local events have occurred in parallel, and the sets of participating processes were disjoint, they could have occurred in sequence. We'll call it the splitting rule.
(ii) Splitting Rule: G = (e 1 , . . . e n ), G ∈ V , G is on U . Given U 1 , U 2 s.t. U 1 ∪ U 2 = U and U 1 , U 2 disjoint, then we can "split" any G into G 1 and G 2 :
Condition (iii) says that if some local events have occurred in sequence, the sets of participating processes were disjoint, and there was no send receive pair in them, they could have occurred in parallel.
(iii) Joining Rule:
Systems: We consider three kinds of systems. Asynchronous systems are the systems as described above but without broadcasts. So in asynchronous systems the only communications are via send and receive. Synchronous systems are the systems in which all the communications are done using broadcasts where we don't have the events send and receive. Finally, we use the name mixed communications systems for the systems with both kinds of communications available.
Language and Semantics
Let L 0 be a language which describes properties of the global histories in a protocol P. So for every sentence A in L 0 , and for every history H ∈ P, A is either true or false in H.
We want to make sure that in every history initially every processor has some "private" information not known to any other processor. To accomplish that we assume that we have in our language a countable set of propositions L 1 = {Q i,j } i,j∈N . Q i,j is the proposition that the jth input value of i is 1. All Q i,j are independent. Private information of i in H are P i,j which are Q i,j or its negation depending on whether Q i,j is true in H or not. Note that the private information is not a truth value of any formula, but which formula we're looking at.
L is the closure of L 0 under truth functional connectives. L can be extended to a larger language L C which is the closure of L under common knowledge operators C U (for U ⊆ N ) and the usual truth functional connectives. C U (A) means that there is common knowledge of A among processes from U .
The knowledge of a single process corresponds to C {i} . We will then use the notation 5 K i for C {i} . When we restrict ourselves to a subset of L C in which all common knowledge operators are in fact the knowledge operators (the sets U in C U are always singletons) then we use the notation L K .
The class of all models we consider is the class of all protocols P as described in the previous section. Fix P. Now we define the notion H |= A for A in L + by recursion on the complexity of A. 0) If A is from L 0 then the semantics is given. 1) If A is Q i,j then A is true in H if the jth bit of an input of processor i in H is 1:
Theorem 1 : Let Σ C be the alphabet whose symbols are {C U } U ⊆N For all x, y in Σ * C , and all formulae A, for all
Corollary 1 : Let Σ K be the alphabet whose symbols are {K 1 , . . . , K n } For all a in Σ K , and for all x, y, in Σ * K , and all formulae A, xayA ↔ xaayA and hence for all H, H |= xayA iff H |= xaayA. I.e. repeated occurrences of a are without effect and if xay ∈ T K (A, H) then ∀n xa n y ∈ T K (A, H).
Definition : Given a formula A and a history H, the level of A at H, L(A, H) is the set of x in Σ * C such that H |= xA, and x contains no substrings
If H is clear from the context, or not important, then we shall drop it as a parameter. If we restrict ourselves to the K i operators, we denote the level of A in H by L K (A, H).
Embeddability
Now we will try to characterize levels of knowledge. First we need to introduce the embeddability ordering on strings which turns out to be important here.
Definition : Given two strings x and y, we say that x is embeddable in y (x ≤ y), if all the symbols of x occur in y, in the same order, but not necessarily consecutively. Formally: 1) x ≤ x, ≤ x for all x 2) x ≤ y if there exist x , x , y , y , (y , y = ), such that x = x x , y = y y , and x ≤ y , x ≤ y . and ≤ is the smallest relation satisfying (1) and (2).
Thus the string aba is embeddable in itself, in aaba and in abca, but not in aabb.
Properties of the embeddability relation ≤ Fact 1: Embeddability is a well partial order, i.e. it is not only well founded, but every linear order that extends it is a well order (equivalent condition: it is well founded and every set of mutually incomparable elements is finite).
Fact 2: Embeddability can be tested in linear time, e.g by a nondeterministic finite automaton with two input tapes.
For a proof of fact 1 see [H] . Fact 2 is straightforward.
We also need a stronger relation defined on Σ * C , which we call C-embeddability. Definition : Given two strings x and y, we say that x is C-embeddable in y (x y), if 1) If V ⊆ U then C V C U 2) x y if there exist x , x , y , y , (y , y = ), such that x = x x , y = y y , and x y , x y . and is the smallest relation satisfying (1) and (2).
Fact 3: For any x, y ∈ Σ * , x ≤ y iff x y.
Fact 4: C-embeddability is a well partial order.
Fact 3 is easy. It is also easy to check that C-embeddability is a partial order. It is well founded, because regular embeddability is well founded and for given x ∈ Σ * C there are only finitely many y ∈ Σ * C s.t. |x| = |y| and y x. There are only finitely many incomparable elements in Σ * C with respect to ≤, and there are more incomparable elements with respect to ≤ than with respect to , so is a well partial order.
2
If ≤ is a partial order on S, we can define a notion of a downward closed subset of S:
Definition : R ⊆ S is downward closed iff x ∈ R implies ∀y ≤ x, y ∈ R.
We will look at downward closed sets with respect to embeddability and C-embeddability.
Theorem 2 : Let Σ C be the alphabet whose symbols are {C U } U ⊆N . Then for all strings x, y Σ * C , if x y then for all histories H, if H |= yA then H |= xA.
The Main Results
Corollary 1 : Every level of knowledge is a downward closed set with respect to . 2
Theorem 3 : There are only countably many levels of knowledge and in fact all of them are regular subsets of Σ * (where Σ is either Σ K or Σ C ). 2
Fact 5: Eric Pacuit of the CUNY Graduate center and ourselves have shown that in contrast with knowledge there are uncountably many possible levels of rational belief. This is curious as truth is the only condition which (formally) separates knowledge from rational belief. These results will appear elsewhere.
Corollary : The membership problem for a level of knowledge can be solved in linear time.
Theorem 4 : If L is a non-empty finite subset of Σ * K , then L is downward closed iff for some k,
where x i ∈ Σ * K . This theorem reiterates the fact that the finite levels are characterized by their maximal elements (x 1 , ..., x k are maximal).
Definition: A formula A is persistent if whenever H |= A and H extends H, then H |= A.
Theorem 5 : If A is persistent then so is K i (A) for any i.
Theorem 6: Every formula A which is a boolean combination of P i 's is persistent. 2 Theorem 7: Every formula of the form xA where A is a boolean combination of P i 's, and x is a string of knowledge operators is persistent.
Theorem 8 [Chandy, Misra] : If communication is purely asynchronous, and for some histories H, H , s.t. H is an initial segment of H :
H |= K 1 K 2 ...K n A and H |= K n A then in H − H there must be a sequence of messages: m n−1 , m n−2 , . . . , m 1 s.t. m n−1 is sent by n and reaches n − 1 (maybe via some other processes),. . .,m 1 is sent by 2 and (maybe indirectly) reaches 1 (messages may be different but they all must imply A).
Moreover if A doesn't depend on any local event of n (its truth value depends on some event e ∈ E n ) then there must be some event of the form r(i, n, m) occurring after H but before s(n, n − 1, m n−1 ).
Theorem 9 : Every finite downward closed set is the set L(A, H) for an appropriate A and H in some asynchronous protocol.
Theorem 10 : Every downward closed set L of strings without repetitions is L(A, H) for suitable A and H in a synchronous system with at least 3 processors.
Theorem 11: In a two processor system with only synchronous communication available, no finite level containing strings of length ≥ 2 can be achieved for any formula A.
Theorem 12: In system with k-casts, i.e. with broadcasts involving at most k processors, it is impossible to achieve common knowledge of any new fact in a group of size > k.
